Problems with the EFG formalism: a solution attempt using observations by Kovařík, Vojtěch & Lisý, Viliam
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
06
29
1v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
4 J
un
 20
19
Problems with the EFG formalism:
a solution attempt using observations
a cautionary tale of why you should use partially-observable stochastic games instead
Kovarik Vojtech, Lisy Viliam
vojta.kovarik@gmail.com viliam.lisy@agents.fel.cvut.cz
June 17, 2019
Abstract
We argue that the extensive-form game (EFG) model isn’t powerful enough to express all important
aspects of imperfect information games, such as those related to decomposition and online game solving.
We present a principled attempt to fix the formalism by considering information partitions that correspond
to observations. We show that EFGs cannot be “fixed” without additional knowledge about the original
task, and show how to extend the EFG model under this assumption. However, during our investigation,
we ultimately concluded that a better solution is to abandon EFGs entirely and instead adopt a model
based on partially observable stochastic games. The primary contribution of the text thus lies in exposing
the problems with EFGs and presenting a detailed study on introducing imperfect information by adding
observations into an underlying perfect-information model.
1 Introduction
The remainder of this paper operates under the assumption that the best way to fix the model we use to talk
about imperfect information games is to extend the extensive-form game (EFG) model. While writing this
text, we came to believe that a better solution is to adopt a model based on partially-observable stochastic
games. For a definition of such a model and an overview of related literature, we invite the reader to see
[KSB+].
Why do we need a new notation? While the classical EFG formalism is very useful, it has grown
outdated — the recent algorithmic breakthroughs such as [MSB+] rely on decomposition, exploiting concepts
such as augmented information sets and public states which aren’t present in the classical EFG notation.
Coincidentally, multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) solves similar problems as the EFG community,
but there hasn’t been a lot of transfer of ideas between the two areas. Making the EFG literature more
accessible to the MARL community would simplify this transfer, as well as making the thinking about the
connections more efficient. These two reasons lead us to believe it is time to revise the model we use to talk
about imperfect information games.
The goal of this text: This text presents an analysis which should serve as an incremental step towards
revising the model for imperfect information games. We focus on a narrower list of desiderata, aiming for
notation which defines
• augmented information sets – being able to talk about available information even when it isn’t my turn
(e.g., for the construction of resolving gadget [Bur]),
• observations – to analyze how players receive and handle information (mainly since the approach seems
natural, interesting, and relevant).
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We aim to do this in such a way that
• the new concepts fit together within one framework,
• the players get as much information as possible, as soon as possible (good for online play, leads to
smaller subgames that are cheaper to solve),
• the resulting notation is familiar to people used to the classical notation.
1.1 Specific arguments for why the current notation doesn’t suffice
• There are currently definitions of augmented information sets ([BJB]), public states ([JWBZ]) and
subgames ([BJB]) in the literature. However, they do not necessarily always fit together (at the very
least, the relationship between the definitions from [BJB] and [JWBZ] is not obvious).
• These definitions currently do not behave as one would intuitively expect them to:
– One straightforward interpretation of the augmented information set definition from [BJB] is
“g, h ∈ H belong to same I ∈ Iaugi if they have the sequence of i’s actions and classical information
sets visited by i.”
– One way of defining public states is as “subsets of H closed under the membership within the
elements of Iaugi for each i”.
– However, this means that players will group all nodes between their action and their next infor-
mation set. This partitioning leads to a strange behavior (for example, in poker, see Figure 1).
• We claim that the classical imperfect information EFG model is insufficient for some purposes and
that the concepts such as augmented information sets either cannot be derived from it in a domain-
independent way (Section 4.2).
• While the classical model of imperfect information in games answers the question of which information
a player has available; it is under-specified in that it doesn’t explain when the information becomes
available. One way of interpreting the classical model is by assuming that the player receives no
information when it isn’t his turn. However, this is often an inaccurate way of modeling the actual
situation – when taken literally, this would correspond to each player only entering the room where
the game is being played upon the start of his turn, being told the history of the game by a referee,
taking his action, and then leaving the room again. Moreover, having to assume a player receives no
information during his turn means he cannot use the time between his turns as effectively as he might
otherwise.
In Section 2, we list the background relevant to the text that follows — we use the perfect-information
extensive-form game model as the “underlying model” and turn it into the “classical” imperfect information
model by adding the “classical” information partitions.
Section 3 formalizes the concept of observations built on top of the underlying model. We start by
discussing the setting where the players aren’t able to remember the observations they receive, but we
quickly modify it in favor of the approach where players have perfect recall with respect to observations and
their actions. We define two variants of observation histories, depending on whether the players can tell where
one observation ends and another begins or not. We also introduce information partitions corresponding to
observations, and the dual notion of observations corresponding to information partitions.
In Section 4, we present and discuss a list of technical desiderata for observations and the corresponding
information partitions. We give examples of different ways in which these properties might fail to hold. We
also investigate the limitations of defining observations based solely on the classical imperfect information
model, without the guidance of the motivating real-life problem.
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Figure 1: Failure of the recent EFG definitions. From left to right: (a): A subset of the public tree as
we intuitively imagine it in the game of limit Texas hold ’em, corresponding to a history where both players
only placed the standard bet sizes, never folding or raising. (b) and (c): Classical (solid) and augmented
(dashed) information sets of player 1 and player 2. (d): The public states actually corresponding to these
information partitions. As we can see, there are only five public states along this history, rather than 12 as
one might intuitively expect, and they do not even correspond to the rounds of the game (which might still
be acceptable).
Finally, Section 5 introduces the proposed observation-based model of imperfect-information games.
It first analyzes the notion of deducing features from observations, studies the conditions under which
observation-induced information partitions have the structure of a tree, and presents a construction called
“stable modification” that ensures these conditions are met. This section proves that the observation-based
model satisfies the technical desiderata listed earlier, and gives a canonical recipe for building a “coarse”
observation-based model that corresponds to a given classical model.
We also include an appendix, which briefly lists some ideas related to public states, common knowledge
and subgames (but we do not discuss this topic further). It also contains the description of a game of unfair
matching pennies, which serves as an example of a “tricky” domain where some of the design proposals might
be tested. We conclude with a long list of desiderata for a possible future notation.
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2 Background
2.1 The Underlying Model
We can use the sequential model of EFGs, where a state in the game is represented by sequences of actions
(of the players and – if present – chance) that lead to it being reached. The ingredients of such M =
〈A,H, N, P, σc, u〉 are the following:
• A is a finite set of all actions available in the game.
• H ⊂ {a1a2 · · · an| ai ∈ A, n ∈ N ∪ {0}} is the set of histories legal in the game. We assume that H
forms a non-empty finite tree1.
– We use g ⊏ h to denote that h extends g. This is not the strict version of extension, i.e. we have
h ⊏ h for each h.
– The root of H is the empty sequence ∅. The set of leaves of H is denoted Z and its elements z
are called terminal histories. The set of non-leaf elements of H are H \ Z and its elements h are
called non-terminal histories.
– By A(h) := {a ∈ A | ha ∈ H} we denote the set of actions available at h.
• The players in the game are {1, . . . , N, c}, where c denotes the chance (sometimes also called nature).
• P : H \ Z → {1, . . . , N, c} is the player function which controls who acts in a given history.
– We use i to denote elements of the player set {1, . . . , N, c}.
– DenotingHi := {h ∈ H\Z| P (h) = i}, we partition the histories asH = H1∪· · ·∪HN∪Hc∪(H\Z).
• σc is the chance strategy defined on Hc. For each h ∈ Hc, σc(h) is a probability distribution over A(h).
• u = (ui)Ni=1 contains the utility functions, where ui : Z → R.
The understanding here is that the game starts in the state h0 = ∅, then the player P (h0) picks an action
a1 ∈ A(h0) (or a0 ∼ σc(h0) is picked randomly when P (h0) = c), and the game transitions to a new state
h1 = h0a1. This continues until the game reaches some terminal state z = a0 · · ·an. Once this happens, each
player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} receives the reward ui(z). The goal of each player is to choose actions in a way that
maximizes ui(z).
Remark 2.1. Modifying EFGs formally is cumbersome.
In the underlying model where “elements of H = sequences of actions”, some game-modifying operations are
ill-defined or at least cumbersome to do. Examples: a) creating a subgame by replacing the upper part of
the tree by a single chance node b) inserting a dummy node. The model that uses an arbitrary set H and
transition function T : (H \ Z) × A → H, such as POSG, would be better for this (but perhaps worse for
other things).
Notation 2.2. For ∅ 6= h ∈ H we will use the convention of rewriting h as h = h′a, where h′ ∈ H, a ∈ A(h′).
2.2 The Classical Definition of Imperfect Information
The standard way of introducing imperfect information into EFGs is to define (classical) information sets.
These group together all the histories that the player cannot tell apart. Formally, a classical information
partition for player i is any partition of Hi s.t. whenever two histories g, h ∈ Hi belong to the same element
of the partition, they necessarily have Ai(g) = Ai(h).
Notation 2.3. We use Icl =
(
Icl1 , . . . , I
cl
N
)
to denote the classical information partitions (i.e. those that are
always defined on Hi only). For h ∈ Hi we denote by Icli (h) the element of I
cl
i that contains h.
1Recall that in the context of sequences, a tree is a set closed under initial segments, e.g. we have a1 · · · an ∈ H =⇒
a1 · · · ak ∈ H whenever k ≤ n.
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3 Observations and Perfect Recall
Suppose we have a real-life problem P that includes dealing with imperfect information, and all relevant actors
have perfect recall. Optionally, we might already have a classical imperfect information model
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
of
P . We use a (perfect information) EFG model M to formally describe the underlying situation in P . Our
goal is to formalize the notions of augmented information sets and public states in M in such a way that is
useful for some of the recent game-theoretic algorithms and maximally advantageous for online-play. In this
section, we describe the observation formalism that shall be useful for discussing this topic.
3.1 Observations Without Recall
To introduce some of the ideas related to observations, we start with a brief discussion of the setting where
the actors aren’t able to remember their observations. Note that this setting can be used to analyze perfect
recall games since histories can be provided by the environment through observations. A secondary goal of
this discussion is to allow for a comparison with the alternative proposed in Section 3.2.
We add observations as an extension of the underlying model. An important assumption we make is that
each player knows exactly how this model works and how the generation of observations works. At each
state h ∈ H, each player receives some observation. As an example, suppose player 1 observes the message
“Ugh!”. We assume the observations convey no meaning of themselves, so all that he can tell is that he is
currently in one of the states which produce the observation “Ugh!”2 (see the bottom left part of Figure 2).
Formally, this can be done by using the pair 〈M,O〉, where M = M cl and O = (O1, . . . , ON ) are the
observation-generating functions Oi : H → Ono recall for some set Ono recall of all possible observations. When
the players have no memory, the information sets that correspond to these observations are
{g ∈ H | Oi(g) = Oi(h)}.
In other words, all the information that has been observed is lost, and only the current observation is used
to build the information set.
Note that the corresponding information partition covers the whole H – in particular, it covers the terminal
nodes Z. All “non-classical” information partitions presented in this text will have this property. While the
information available in terminal nodes is usually not strategically important, this aspect of the game might
sometimes be interesting, for example, when the game is played repeatedly. Most importantly, it comes at
no additional cost to the complexity of the discussion.
The following example shows how the classical model of imperfect information can arise as a particular
case of this model.
Example 3.1. Classical information sets coincide with those given by observing information-set labels.
Suppose that Icli is the “classical” information partition for player i in a game G =
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
. The “classical”
observations tell i the name3 of the current information set whenever it is his turn to act:
Ocli (h) :=
{
“Not your turn.” h /∈ Hi
Icli (h) h ∈ Hi.
Obviously, the information sets generated by Ocl coincide with Icli in the sense that for each h ∈ Hi,
{g ∈ H | Oi(g) = Oi(h)} = Icli (h).
Note that since the agent has no memory, he relies on the observations to provide all required information.
If the observations were provided verbally be a referee, he would have to repeat the whole history of the game
2We could also assume that observations do convey some information about the current state of the game. This assumption
would increase the “learnability” of 〈M,O〉 (see the list of desiderata in the appendix) at the cost of introducing another layer
of notation.
3The understanding here is that the observation O = Icl
i
(h) gives i the name (label, number, hash-code) of the current
information set, and he then constructs I himself via Ii(O), using his knowledge of 〈M,O〉. Formally, it might be more precise
to use some injective labeling mapping l : Icl
i
→ N and write Oi(h) = l(Icli (h)). We choose not to do this for brevity.
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Figure 2: Observations of the maximizing player (top, denoted X, Y, Z, W) and the corresponding memory-
less information partitions (bottom left) and perfect-recall (bottom-right) information sets.
on each turn. In practical terms, a typical element of Ono recall in Chess would look like O = “Game started.
White Pawn from B2 to B3. Black Pawn from B7 to B6. . . .White queen from C4 to E4. Captured black
tower at E4. Your turn.”. While this is a reasonable assumption for some practical implementations, it
does not give a deeper insight into how different augmented information sets arise in games. Since the
understanding of augmented information sets is the goal of this text, we will now turn our attention to the
more detailed model where the agent can keep track of the observation history for himself.
3.2 Observations with Perfect Recall
When the players have perfect recall, the situation is different. They can “write down” all of the observations
they have received from the external environment so far together with all the decisions they have made, and
potentially all kinds of other information (such as time-stamps for each observation, their thoughts/internal
state upon making each decision, . . . ). To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we shall only consider the
situation where each agent i takes the observations (O1, O2, . . . , On) received so far together with the actions
(a1, . . . , ak) he has made and combines them into his observation history ~Oi in a yet-unspecified manner.
The agent is then able to use ~O, rather than On, to figure out where in the game tree he might currently be.
(Alternative names for ~O might be i’s action-observation history, information history, memory, log. We
will stick with “observation history” in this text, with the critical disclaimer that ~O contains not only
observations but also memories of past decisions, and these are of a different type than observations.)
It is surely possible to view observations as monolithic objects which cannot be further reduced (such as O
= “White moved a Pawn from B2 to B3 and it is now your turn.” without the ability to split the sentence in
two). However, it will be useful to assume that there are two types of objects, elementary observations (such
as o1 = “White moved a Pawn from B2 to B3.” and o2 = “It is now your turn.”) and “big” observations
received in a single state (such as O = (o1, o2)).
Consider an alternative scenario where the above elementary observations o1 and o2 were instead made
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in two successive states (e.g., because the opponent pressed the button on the tournament clock 30 seconds
after making his move) and suppose there is a strategic advantage to being able to tell the two scenarios
apart. We need to decide whether we want our model to be such that the player can distinguish between the
two scenarios based on the observations received4?
To analyze the situation better, we shall formalize both versions and compare them. We can go ahead
and spoil the conclusion: each version has its advantages and disadvantages, and they are, in general, not
equivalent. However, the domains where the two approaches differ have important undesirable properties,
and should be avoided (or rather, slightly different M needs to be chosen to serve as an underlying model
for given “problematic” real-life problem P ).
Definition 3.2 (Observation space). The space of possible observations in M can be an arbitrary non-empty
set, and shall be denoted O.
In the Chess example, typical elements of O can be “Game started.”, “White Pawn from B2 to B3.”, “Black
tower at E4 has been captured.”, “Check by white.”, “Game ended.”, “You won.”. Of course, there might
be different (e.g., less verbose) ways of encoding these observations. Moreover, observations can transfer all
information the players might be interested in, but they can also be sparser: Suppose black knows that the
white queen is at C4, a black tower is at E4, and that it is white’s turn. Then the message “C4 to E4”
suffices for him to deduce that the queen took his tower, and he doesn’t have to be told explicitly.
The following “set variant” of observations captures the “you can tell the difference” approach.
Definition 3.3 (Observations, set variant). An observation function is a vector O{} = (O{1}, . . . ,O{N}),
where O{i} : h ∈ H 7→ O{i}(h) ⊂ O. The set O{i}(h) is called i’s observation at h.
By X∗ := {(x1, . . . , xn) | n ∈ N ∪ {0}, xi ∈ X} we denote the set of all finite sequences in X (including
the empty sequence ∅).
Definition 3.4 (Observation histories, set variant). We define the player i’s observation history function
~O{i} : h ∈ H 7→ ~O{i}(h) ∈ (P(O)∪A)
∗ as follows. We set ~O{i}(∅) := (O{i}(∅) ) for h = ∅ ( ~O{i}(∅) := ∅ when
O{i}(∅) = ∅). Otherwise, we have h = h
′a, a ∈ A(h′) and ~O{i}(h
′) = (X1, . . . , Xn) for some Xj ∈ P(O)∪A.
For non-empty O{i}(h) we set
~O{i}(h) :=
{(
X1, . . . , Xn, a, O{i}(h)
)
h′ ∈ Hi(
X1, . . . , Xn, O{i}(h)
)
h′ /∈ Hi.
Empty observations are ignored, i.e. for O{i}(h) = ∅ we set
~O{i}(h) :=
{
(X1, . . . , Xn, a ) h
′ ∈ Hi
(X1, . . . , Xn ) = ~O{i}(h
′) h′ /∈ Hi
.
To formalize the approach where it doesn’t have to be possible to tell where one observation ends and
another begins, we define the “sequence variant” of the above notation.
Definition 3.5 (Observation, sequence variant). An observation function is a vector O() = (O(1), . . . ,O(N)),
where O(i) : h ∈ H 7→ O(i)(h) ∈ O
∗. The set O(i)(h) is called i’s observation at h.
Definition 3.6 (Observation histories, sequence variant). We define the player i’s observation history func-
tion ~O(i) : h ∈ H 7→ ~O(i)(h) ∈ (O ∪ A)
∗ as follows. For h = ∅ we set ~O(i)(h) := O(i)(h). Otherwise, we have
h = h′a, a ∈ A(h′) and ~O(i)(h
′) = (x1, . . . , xn) for some xj ∈ O ∪ A. For O(i)(h) = (o1, . . . , ok) we set
~O(i)(h) :=
{
(x1, . . . , xn, a, o1, . . . , ok ) h
′ ∈ Hi
(x1, . . . , xn, o1, . . . , ok ) h
′ ∈ Hi.
4Of course, we could add a third observation “the opponent not doing anything for 30 seconds”, but that isn’t the point.
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Note that in the sequence variant, empty observations are ignored naturally.
When there is no danger of confusion, we omit the brackets and simply write O = (O1, . . . ,ON ), Oi(h)
and ~Oi(h). When we don’t want to specify whether a given observation has the set or sequence form, we shall
denote it as Oi(h) := a, b, c — with the understanding that it can be turned into either {a, b, c} or (a, b, c)
by writing O{i}(h) or O(i)(h).
With the help of observation histories, players can partition H into information sets:
Definition 3.7 (Information sets and partitions). The information partitions corresponding to an observation
function O are defined as IO = (IO1 , . . . , I
O
N ), I
O
i := {I
O
i (h) | h ∈ H}, where
IOi (h) := I
O
i
(
~Oi(h)
)
:= {g ∈ H | ~Oi(g) = ~Oi(h)}.
Note that we do not need to use the perfect-recall model to reason about actors who have perfect re-
call. Indeed, the perfect-recall model can be turned into a memory-less model by replacing Oi by ~Oi with
Ono memory := (O∪A)∗, and the resulting model would be equally good. We do not claim that the memory-
less model is worse — rather, we claim that it only makes sense to consider memory-less models that arise
in the just described manner.
So far, we have shown how to generate information partitions from observations. However, information
sets are, in a sense, dual to observations, and there is a canonical way of going in the opposite direction:
Example 3.8. Observations corresponding to an information partition.
Consider an arbitrary collection of partitions I = (I1, . . . , IN ) of H and, writing either h = ∅ or h = h′a for
h ∈ H as in Notation 2.2, define
OIi (h) :=
{
Ii(h) h = ∅ ∨ Ii(h) 6= Ii(h
′)
∅ Ii(h) = Ii(h′).
To extend the definition to collections Ii which only cover some subset of H, we could replace h′ in the above
formula by “the longest prefix of h that belongs to
⋃
Ii” and set OIi (h) := ∅ for h /∈
⋃
Ii.
4 Technical Desiderata and Related Obstacles
When constructing an observation-based model 〈M,O〉 of P in the (optional) presence of a classical model〈
M cl, Icl
〉
, it is natural to consider the following properties:
(¬CH) No changes to M cl – the underlying model shouldn’t be modified in any way, i.e. M =M cl.
To simplify the the notation, we will henceforth assume that (¬CH) holds unless explicitly stated otherwise.
(CONS) Consistency with
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
– the information sets generated by O should coincide with Icl:
IOi |Hi = I
cl
i – in other words, we have (∀h ∈ Hi) : I
O
i (h) ∩Hi = I
cl
i (h).
(APS) Acting-player separation – each player should be able to tell whether it’s currently his turn to act or
not:
(∀h ∈ Hi) (∀g ∈ H−i) : I
O
i (h) 6= I
O
i (g).
(ISO) Immediate self-observation – additionally to remembering their own actions, the players should also be
able to observe their own actions as soon as they are made.
(IO) Immediate observation – more generally, if an event is visible to an actor in P , then the corresponding
player in 〈M,O〉 should observe the corresponding piece of information as soon as the event happens.
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(TSIP) Tree-structured information partitions – each IOi should form a tree when endowed with the partial
order I ⊏ J ⇐⇒ (∃g ∈ I)(∃h ∈ J) : g ⊏ h.5
As we will see in Lemma 5.2, (TSIP) is equivalent to the following stability condition.
(STAB) Stability – the observations generated by IO should be equivalent to O:
IO = IO
⋆
, where O⋆ := OI
O
.
We make the following observations and remarks:
• Most of the above conditions speak about the properties of IO. In this sense, the following text speaks
about how to design well-behaved augmented information sets, and observations are only used as a
useful formal language for the discussion.
• This notation allows for a simple-yet-formal definition of perfect recall in the classical model:
Definition 4.1 (Perfect recall). Players in
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
have perfect recall if OI
cl
satisfies (CONS).
• We do not claim that it is necessary to satisfy the condition (ISO). Rather, our understanding is that
the model shouldn’t break when it is included. For example, we might wish to include the action in a
public observation that is visible to everyone, and hence also to the player who has made the action.
• (STAB) can be viewed as a stronger version of consistency of OI
O
with IO (in the sense of (CONS)).
4.1 Observations and the Classical Model
Example 4.2 (Classical observations). Observations corresponding to Icl satisfy (CONS) and (APS), but
fail (IO) and (ISO) (and (STAB)).
The classical information partitions are “thin” in the sense that it is impossible for h = h′a and h′ to belong
to the same I ∈ Icli . It follows that O
Icl can also be written as
Ocli (h) :=
{
∅ h /∈ Hi
Icli (h) h ∈ Hi.
These observations are consistent with Icl (tautologically) and satisfy (APS) (since h belongs to Hi iff ~Oi(h)
ends with an information set).
However, they fail (ISO) — indeed, for example in a two-player game without chance where players take
one turn each, if player 1 didn’t remember his action a1 at some h ∈ H1, he would only learn about it through
observing the next information set I1(ha1a2) where he acts (and not already during the opponent’s turn at
ha1). More generally, OI
cl
fails (IO) as soon as a visible action of another player leads to some g /∈ Hi (e.g.
in any two-player perfect-information game with chance). Later (Example 4.4) we will see that OI
cl
also
sometimes fails (STAB).
To simplify the notation, we introduce the notion of adding two observation functions together:
Notation 4.3. Let O and O′ be two observation functions in M . By O + O′ we denote the observation
function defined, for Oi(h) = o1, . . . , on and O
′
i(h) = o
′
1, . . . , o
′
k, as O
+
i (h) := o1, . . . , on, o
′
1, . . . , o
′
k.
The observations from Example 4.2 can be modified to get (ISO). However, this comes at a cost:
5Without (TSIP), public states cannot serve as roots of subgames. Showing this requires, e.g., the game from Figure 3, and
definition of public states and subgames (which aren’t presented in this text at all).)
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Example 4.4 (Immediate self-observation). Enforcing (ISO) together with (¬CH) and (APS) can destroy
(CONS) when the set approach is adopted. Enforcing (¬CH) together with (CONS) and (APS) can destroy
(STAB).
Consider the observations Oiso which let each player observe his action a in the history immediately following
the one where he took a:
Oisoi (h) :=
{
∅ h = ∅ ∨ h′ /∈ Hi
a h′ ∈ Hi.
Combining these with the classical observations into Oiso+cl := Oiso +Ocl yields observations which satisfy
(ISO) (by definition) and (APS) (by Example 4.2).
However, as the game in Figure 3 illustrates, Oiso+cl{} can be inconsistent because the player can now
always tell whether he acts two times in a row or not. The sequence version Oiso+cl() will remain consistent,
but it will be unstable. In fact, the only partition, of M cl from Figure 3, satisfying both (CONS) and (APS)
is the one depicted in therein. Since this partition is unstable, we get the second part of the claim. Adding a
single dummy node (Figure 3, right) leads to both Oiso+cl{} and O
iso+cl
() satisfying (CONS), (APS), (ISO) and
(STAB), at the cost of modifying the domain (i.e. failing (¬CH)).
1
2
slow
1
quick
0.5
high
skill
0
run
1
2
slow
−1
quick
ambush
sneak
0.5
low
skill
sneak
Figure 3: Sneaking game where the skill of one player determines whether the other will detect him, and
different ways of subsequent attacking are effective in each scenario (left). This is a domain where set-
like observations together with immediate self-observation are inconsistent. (Credit to Toma´sˇ Gavencˇiak
for realizing this might be possible.) Even without (ISO), the augmented information states are unstable
(middle), but a stable modification can be constructed by adding one dummy node (right).
Example 4.4 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5 (A case against (¬CH)). In general, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve (CONS),
(APS) and (STAB) unless (¬CH) is dropped.
In some sense, the underlying model of the sneaking game counterexample is anomalous. The following
lemma characterizes those domains which do not have to be modified in order to make Oiso+cl work:
Lemma 4.6 (Well-behaved domains). If the condition (WBD) holds for
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
, then Ocl+iso satisfies
(CONS), (APS), (ISO) and (STAB) without having to drop (¬CH).
(WBD)
(
∀I ∈ Icli
)
(∀g, h ∈ I) (∀a ∈ A(I)) : (ha ∈ Hi & ga ∈ Hi) ∨ (ha /∈ Hi & ga /∈ Hi) .
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Proof. As noted in Example 4.2, Ocl satisfies (CONS). If
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
has perfect recall, adding Oiso adds no
new information at Hi, so consistency is preserved. (APS) holds since ~Oi(h) ends in an infoset if and only if
h belongs to Hi (thanks to Oiso, it ends in an action for h /∈ Hi). (ISO) trivially holds thanks to Oiso.
To prove (STAB), note that stability can only fail if there are two clasical infosets I ⊏ J of player i, such
that there is no classical infoset of i between I and J , and i receives a different sequence of observations
between I and J depending on which path they take. For Ocl+iso, this can only happen because of Oiso.
Moreover, this can only happen if some path from I leads immediately to J , while another path first visits
an augmented infoset where i doesn’t act. This implies the result since (WBD) ensures that such a situation
cannot occur.
This lemma also serves as a guide for modifying those domains where Oiso+cl would be unstable or incon-
sistent. Indeed, the obvious way of meeting the assumption (WBD) is to add a dummy chance node with a
single noop action below each player node. However, we typically do not have to go so far, as it suffices to
add dummy nodes after those actions in A(I) which sometimes lead directly to Hi and sometimes not.
We believe that Corollary 4.5 is a strong argument6 against the “no modifying of M cl” requirement. We
explain that some underlying models weren’t constructed with online-play in mind, and thus, one shouldn’t
expect every such model to be reasonable for modeling real-time decision-making. Luckily, this is not a major
limitation, as the modification suggested by Lemma 4.6 makes close to no changes to H in typical cases, and
doubles the size of H in the worst case.
The last example of this section is related to the immediate observation property.
Example 4.7 (Observations are domain specific). Whether (IO) holds depends not only on Icl, but also on
the original problem P .
We have seen that there are domains where Oiso+cl satisfies (¬CH), (CONS), (APS), (ISO) and (STAB).
However, it will often fail the more general (IO) property. Indeed, consider a trivial betting game which
starts by the referee randomly drawing and revealing one card (either A or B), then player 1 has one second
to decide whether to bet 1 dollar or give up, and then player 2 has an additional one second to decide whether
to bet 1 dollar or give up. If the revealed card was A, then player 1 wins all bets. If it was B, then player 2
wins all bets.
According to the description above, player two should have two seconds to think – one during the first
player’s move, and one during his move. Importantly, he should know the value of the A/B card for the
whole period. However, according to Oiso+cl, he will only have this information for one second, during his
turn. However, we could modify the game definition such that player two now has to have his eyes closed
until his turn begins. In this case, the classical model of the game would remain the same but Oiso+cl would
be the correct description of the situation.
The takeaway from these two examples is that when defining augmented information sets (or observations)
in a specific imperfect information game, one should make design decisions based on the original problem,
rather than on its classical model
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
.
4.2 Extending the Classical Model in the Absence of P
Sometimes we might want to apply an algorithm such as [BJB] or [SˇKL] to an imperfect information game for
which we only have the classical model G =
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
. To do this, we need to define augmented information
sets in H that are consistent with G. Moreover, in resolving it is cheaper to resolve smaller subgames, so it is
desirable to observe as much information as possible (and thus have smaller augmented information sets and
public states). While (IO) is ill-defined in this case (as shown in Example 4.7), it might still be beneficial
to have some automatic way of generating augmented information sets that are reasonably small. An easy-
to-define candidate are the “coarse” augmented information sets corresponding to Oiso+cl (first introduced
in [BJB]). Unfortunately, Oiso+cl fails (IO) even in the case of perfect information games (Figure 4), so
a different solution is required. A natural approach would be to find the “most informative” observations
6However, the argument is not decisive since there might still be other ways of modeling observations that avoid this issue.
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consistent with Icl. However, as shown in Example 4.8, there might be several such observations functions,
without a definite candidate for the “correct” answer.
Figure 4: A perfect information game illustrating that the information partitions corresponding to Oiso+cl
are sometimes too “coarse” to satisfy the immediate observation property (IO).
Example 4.8 (No canonical finest partition). For some games, there is no single finest partition of H
satisfying (CONS).
The games in Figure 5 illustrate that there doesn’t always exist a unique solution to the problem of finding
information partitions that are “maximally informative” (i.e. anything finer would fail either (STAB) or
(CONS)). On the left side of Figure 5, we see a trivial example of a domain with this property. The domain
on the right is a more sophisticated example that shows that sometimes a choice has to be made about which
information to reveal. It follows that it is impossible to find a general formula for “the most informative O”.
This leaves us with three options (of which we prefer the last one).
1. Considering one of the information partitions that cannot be refined further without failing (CONS).
In general, finding such a partition might be hard.
2. Designing a heuristic that finds some reasonable refinement. This might not be worth spending time
on. Note that the ”let players know which information sets they might encounter next during their
turn” approach is good in perfect information games and simultaneous move games, but fails already
in Poker.
3. Ignore the problem, arguing that the correct approach is to consider domain-specific observations.
Figure 5: Domains where the finest partition isn’t unique. Classical information sets are solid, the augmented
information sets are dashed.
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5 The Observation-based Model of Imperfect Information
In this section, we discuss the role of observation in the absence of the classical model of imperfect information.
We formalize the notion of feature-deduction features and discuss stable modifications for general observation-
functions. We define the “official” version of the proposed observation-based model and prove its basic
properties.
5.1 Stability and Deduction from Observations
A feature in M is any function f : D → X , where X is an arbitrary set and D =: dom(f) ⊂ H is the domain
of f . Examples of features are utility ui : Z → R, the player function P : H \ Z → {1, . . . , N, c}, the “Is it
my turn?” function 1Hi : H → {0, 1}, or the list of available actions h ∈ H \ Z 7→ A(h) ⊂ A.
Definition 5.1. Let f be a feature in M and H ⊂ H. We say that the player i can deduce from observations
O the value of f at H if for each h ∈ H ∩ dom(f) the whole Ii(h) ∩H is contained in dom(f) and we have
f(g) = f(h) for each g ∈ IOi (h) ∩H.
For brevity, we will say that “i can deduce f at H” when the context is clear, and omit the “at H” part
when H = H.
Features allows us to formulate the following characterization of stability:
Lemma 5.2 (Equivalent formulations of stability). The pair 〈M,O〉 satisfies (TSIP) if and only if it satisfies
(STAB). This is further equivalent the conjunction of (WBD) and each player i being able to deduce Oi.
In particular, if M satisfies (WBD), then any O{} in M satisfies (STAB). This isn’t the case for O(): While
each player i can, by definition of IO, deduce ~O(i), he might not always be able to deduce O(i). Apart from
the above lemma, this is illustrated by, for example, the sneaking game (Figure 3).
Proof. (TSIP) implies that any two histories in the same infoset have the same observation sequences, which
immediately gives (STAB). Conversely, the only way the stability condition can fail is when some two histories
from the same infoset have different ~Oi(·)-s, which contradicts (TSIP).
Similarly, if (TSIP) doesn’t hold, then, for some player i, there must exist two different ~Oi(·)-s which,
upon transitioning to successor histories, become identical. This can only happen if either i cannot deduce Oi
at the successor infoset, or if one transition adds an action and the other doesn’t – in other words, if (WBD)
doesn’t hold. Conversely, (WBD) and being able to tell the most-recent observation imply that observation
sequences that once diverged will never become the same, which yields (TSIP).
As mentioned above, the obvious solution to the problem of stability is “just use O{}”. However, there is
an alternative solution related to Lemma 4.6. By adding dummy chance nodes, each domain can be modified
in such a way that it satisfies (STAB) even with O(). An example of how this can be done in practice is in
Figure 6. These nodes can be interpreted as a sequence of auxiliary nodes where the game-engine (or referee)
processes the consequences of the latest action and optionally sends elementary observations to players.
Lemma 5.3 (Stable modification). For each 〈M,O〉 there exists a modification
〈
M˜, O˜
〉
such that the original
structure of IO is preserved, O˜() satisfies (STAB), and we have |H˜| ≤ |H|+ |H||I
O|.
Proof sketch. 7 Note that typically, the increase in size will be much smaller than the worst-case bound.
However, the bound is asymptotically tight, as illustrated in Figure 7. The idea is that in the most pessimistic
scenario, we can split each h that generates, say, an observation Oi(h) = (a, b, c) into nodes h1, h2, h3 with
Oi(h1) = a, Oi(h2) = b, Oi(h3) = c. Since the length of observations is independent of the size of M , this
leads to a potentially unbounded increase in size. However, we can remove those new states h˜ where ~O(h˜)
7Given our preference to replace EFGs by the model from [KSB+], this proof is only presented as proof sketche, and the
properties of the observation-based model in Section 5.2 are only formulated as a conjecture.
13
A,B
C,D,E
F
A
B,C,D,E
F
A
B
C,D,E
F
A
B
C,D,E
F
Figure 6: A domain with unstable observations (left) and the corresponding stable modification (right).
Maximizer’s observations are next to each history.
doesn’t correspond to any original observation history ~O(h), h ∈ H (and there are at most |I(O)| of those).
This proof-sketch can be formalized by embedding H into the space of sequences in O.
. . .
. . .
A
B B B
0 0,1
1,...,N 2,...,N N
0,1,...,N-1
. . . . . .
. . .
. . .
A
B
0
1
N-1
N
B
0
1
N-1
N
B
0
1
N-1
N
Figure 7: A domain with unstable observations (left) where the smallest stable modification (right) increases
the size of M from linear (3N +1) to quadratic (N2+N +1). A text next to a node denotes the observation
received there.
5.2 The Proposed Definition of the Observation-Based Model
Definition 5.4 (Observation-based model). The pair G = 〈M,O〉 is said to be an observation-based model
(of an imperfect information game) if M satisfies (WBD), O is an observation function in M , and each
player i can deduce
• his own observations (the observation function “feature” Oi : h 7→ Oi(h)),
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• whether he is the acting player (the player function P on Hi or, equivalently, the feature 1Hi),
• his own available actions (the “feature” h ∈ H 7→ A(h) ∈ P(A) on Hi),
• whether the game has ended (the feature 1Z)
• and his own utility (the utility function ui : Z → R).
Whether an observation-based model satisfies (IO) depends on whether the choice of O is suitable for
the specific real-life problem P that 〈M,O〉 is supposed to model. However, all of the remaining technical
desiderata from Section 3 are satisfied:
Conjecture 5.5 (Observation-based model gives a well-defined game). Any observation-based model 〈M,O〉
has the following properties, independently of whether the set or sequence approach is adopted:
(i) 〈M,O〉 satisfies (APS), (TSIP) and (STAB);
(ii) O′ := O +Oiso satisfies (ISO) while being equivalent to O (i.e. we have IO
′
= IO);
(iii) The definition I ′i := {Ii ∩ Hi | Ii ∈ I
O
i } \ {∅} produces a well-defined classical imperfect information
game 〈M, I ′〉 with perfect recall. Moreover, 〈M,O〉 satisfies (¬CH) and (CONS) with respect to 〈M, I ′〉.
As for how an observation-based model can be constructed in practice, consider the following examples:
adding “Your turn!” to Oi(h) for h ∈ Hi ensures that i can tell whether he is the acting player and adding
the pair (“Your utility”, ui(z)) to Oi(z) for z ∈ Z ensures that i can tell his own utility. As a side effect, this
automatically lets the player deduce whether the game has ended.
It is not always necessary to specify features explicitly — since the players have access to M , it would
suffice to for example add (“Game ended at terminal node”, z) to Oi(z) for z ∈ Z, and then i can deduce
the necessary utility himself. However, if we want to ensure that a feature f can be deduced at H ⊂ H, we
can always do the following:
1. add the pair (f, f(h)) to Oi(h) upon first encountering a node h from H ∩ dom(f),
2. add the pair (f, f(h)) whenever the current node h belongs to H ∩ dom(f) and f(h) differs from the
value last encountered in H ∩ dom(f), and
3. not add any “false” observations, i.e. if g ∈ H satisfies f(h) 6= f(g), then (f, f(h)) /∈ Oi(g).
An alternative is to repeat the observation (f, f(h)) for every h ∈ H∩dom(f) (cf. the Frame problem [Wik]).
Definition 5.4 lists some features that players can deduce in every imperfect information game. Actually
– as shown by Remark 5.6 – Definition 5.4 summarizes all of the “standard”8 features that the players can be
allowed to deduce, because for each standard f not listed in Definition 5.4, there is a counterexample domain
where players cannot be consistently allowed to deduce f . This is, in fact, good news, since our formalism
allows us to say, for example, “consider an observation-based model where each player can deduce X”, and
thus elegantly avoid a specific class of pathological domains.
Remark 5.6 (Non-deductible features). For some classical imperfect information games
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
there is
no observation-based model satisfying (¬CH) and (CONS) for which the players can deduce
(i) the player function on the whole H \ Z (e.g. when the opponent might, or might not, lose control of
his actions and be replaced by chance),
(ii) available actions on the whole H \ Z, i.e. those of the opponent or chance (e.g. most card games),
8The authors realize that “standard feature” is not a well-defined notion. We apologize to any reader who finds our list
incomplete.
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Figure 8: An example of a game where augmented information sets of the maximizer (dashed) necessarily
have to be “thick” in order to be both stable and consistent with the classical information sets.
(iii) history length |h| (e.g. the game from Figure 8 or phantom variants of perfect information games, when
the “illegal move” observations are private; in such games, information sets not belonging to the acting
player might contain some h together with its parent h′).
The following example shows a canonical way of extending a classical model into a consistent observation-
based model. This approach is domain-agnostic, but this comes at the cost of (IO). The new model can be
further refined in order to get (IO), but such a modification necessarily has to be domain specific (as noted
in Example 4.7 and 4.8).
Example 5.7 (Coarse observation-based model). For every classical model
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
of P , there exists
〈M,O〉 that satisfies (CONS), (APS), (ISO) and (STAB), but might fail (¬CH) and (IO).
For a fixed
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
, we first construct M ⊃ M cl by adding dummy nodes (chance nodes with a single
noop action) after some of the player nodes, in such a way that (WBD) holds. We then define Oi(h) as the
observation that contains the elements enforced by the following conditions, and no others.
• Oi(h) ∋ (“Current information set: ”, I) ⇐⇒ h ∈ Icli , I = I
cl
i (h)
• Oi(h) ∋ (“Available actions: ”, A(h)) ⇐⇒ h ∈ Hi
• Oi(h) ∋ (“Your last action: ”, a) ⇐⇒ h = h′a, h′ ∈ Hi, a ∈ A(h′)
• Oi(z) ∋ (“Game ended. Utility gained: ”, ui(z)) ⇐⇒ z ∈ Z
With the exception of the “i can tell Oi” condition, it is straightforward to verify that 〈M,O〉 satisfies the
definition of an observation-based model. The “i can tell Oi” condition follows from (WBD). It remains to
show that it is consistent with
〈
M cl, Icl
〉
, i.e. that I ′ = Icl. This can be proven along the lines of “isn’t
consistent =⇒ fails (WBD)”.
6 Conclusion
We have pointed out several issues with the standard EFG model (Figures 1 and 4), as well as examples where
augmented information sets necessarily behave undesirably or against our intuition (Figures 3, 8 and 9). We
described a model that is similar to EFG but uses observations to introduce imperfect information into an
originally fully-observable environment. Any instance of this observation-based model can be turned into a
compatible EFG (Conjecture 5.5), and the converse is also true if one is willing to modify the underlying
perfect-information model and observe some information late (Example 5.7). We have also shown that if one
isn’t willing to make these sacrifices, the task is impossible (Corollary 4.5 and Example 4.8).
The EFG model has not been introduced with online play, decomposition, or observations in mind. Af-
ter reviewing the difficulties that come up when attempting to extend EFGs by adding observations and
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staying consistent with the original model, we ultimately concluded that it is more productive to work
in a model which contains observations natively. Therefore, we believe that for investigating sequential
decision-making in multiagent settings with imperfect information, researchers should adopt a model based
on partially-observable stochastic games (POSGs, see, e.g., [HBZ]), such as the Factored-Observation Game
model described in [KSB+]. We predict this will benefit the researchers who are now working in the EFG
formalism since POSGs will make decomposition easier, and simplify the transfer of ideas between game
theory and multiagent RL (MARL) by using language with which the (more numerous) MARL community
is more familiar. Moreover, POSG-based models offer several advantages over EFGs, such as compact repre-
sentation of cyclic state-spaces, the ability to give feedback in non-terminal states, and natural modeling of
simultaneous decisions.
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A Bonus Exercise
As an example illustrating the difficulties that one can encounter when defining augmented information sets
and public states, we include a “case study” exercise. Consider the game defined by the following description:
Example A.1. Unfair Matching Pennies.
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Figure 9: A classical model for the unfair variant of Matching Pennies.
Two players are playing a real-life game of Matching Pennies for the prize of 10 000 dollars. To ensure that
none of them can cheat, they use a third person as a referee. At the start of the game, each player is in a
separate room. The referee randomly chooses the player who acts first, goes to him, and asks him for his
action. He then goes to the second player and asks him for his action. By default, the players do not get
to know whether they are first or second. Now comes the twist: the referee really hates people who choose
heads — if the first player to choose picks heads, the referee will reveal this to the second player. (From some
reason the players chose this referee even though they know this.)
Exercise A.2. What is the minimal classical model corresponding to the game from Example A.1? How do
(augmented) information sets and public states look like in this M cl? Can players tell whether they have been
betrayed by the referee or not? Is M cl a good underlying model for an observation-based model of this game?
If not, what is the minimal well-behaved modification M of M cl?
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